China’s secret services could use sensors and cameras in the cars to monitor secure areas, wiretap passenger conversations and access phones that are plugged into the vehicle, CSRI senior policy director Sam Goodman said.

  • Saleh@feddit.org
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    6 days ago

    Misconfigured to the point that all the data was collected, centrally stored and then accessible from the outside. These are at least two misconfiguration and one mayor architecture issue (central storage).

      • Saleh@feddit.org
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        6 days ago

        Since Spring Boot version 1.5 is over 7 years old, that’s unlikely to be the cause. Instead, someone must have explicitly enabled the heap dump endpoint in production without authentication.

        That is the major configuration problem that got the data accesible

        Let’s recap. We now have user profiles showing which cars people drive and tracking data that sometimes spans years. While this data collection is covered in the terms and conditions for product improvement analysis, Volkswagen says they track this data to understand battery lifecycles better. Still, the need for location data remains unclear. The terms and conditions state that GPS data is truncated, which would significantly reduce tracking capabilities if accuracy drops to around 10 kilometers. Audi and Škoda implemented this correctly—cars from their fleet had location data truncated to approximately 10-kilometer accuracy. However, the problem arose with VW and Seat vehicles, where location data remained precise down to 10 centimeters.

        That is the first configuration problem, to collect this data in the first place and then to collect it down to this level of precision.

        This remains with the major architectural problem.

        They could access complete user profiles and location data by combining this data. The breach revealed:

        Enrollment data for both electric and non-electric vehicles, including details like VIN, model, year, and user ID

        User data, including name, email, phone, and in some cases, physical addresses and preferred dealerships

        EV data: Mileage, battery temperature, battery status, charging status, and even warning light data

        Tracking data only for electric cars: GPS coordinates of the vehicles’ locations recorded every time the engine was turned off

        All this data is stored in one place. Leaving aside the discussion of whether this data should be collected in the first place, there would be a strong reason to separate the data supposedly collected for technical analysis from the data that identifies who owns the car. Of course in the case of location data down to 10cm accuracy that is a bit moot as you can get the home address easily from the location data.

        Please let me know if there was something i missed regarding my assessment of two configuration problems and one architectural problem.

        • troed@fedia.io
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          5 days ago

          Yeah, you missed how this is absolutely nothing like “we wank to you in-car videofeed”-Tesla and “we spy for the Chinese government”-BYD

          A security hole exposing data that the users have agreed to share is nothing like companies willfully breaking user integrity.

          You know this of course, you just don’t like being corrected.